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Bears	or	butterflies?	How	should	zoos	make	value-driven	
decisions	about	their	collections?1	
	
Clare	Palmer,	TJ	Kasperbauer	&	Peter	Sandøe	
	
Introduction	
Zoos	are	ethically	contested	institutions,	not	only	in	terms	of	their	existence,	but	also	with	respect	
to	their	aims,	policies,	and	practices.		Many	of	these	aims,	policies,	and	practices	are	underpinned	
by	 commitments	 to	 defensible	 and	 widely	 shared	 values	 including	 animal	 welfare	 and	 species	
conservation.	However,	as	we	will	argue,	these	values	may	be	in	tension,	forcing	choices	between	
fulfilling	some	aims	at	the	expense	of	others,	or	requiring	trade-offs	where	each	aim	can	be	only	
partially	met.	
	
Such	 tensions	 are	 particularly	 salient	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 variety	 of	 species	 in	 zoo	 collections.	
Obviously,	 zoos	 have	 limited	 space;	 even	 in	 combination,	 zoos	 can	 only	 keep	 a	 tiny	 fraction	 of	
existing	 species,	 and	 keeping	 one	 species	 essentially	 means	 excluding	 others.	 	 So	 what	 should	
drive	 the	 mix	 of	 species	 kept,	 given	 the	 aims	 and	 values	 that	 zoological	 associations	 claim	 to	
endorse?		And	how	should	zoos	respond	to	tensions	and	conflicts	between	these	values	in	terms	
of	their	collections?		
	
We	begin	this	chapter	by	exploring	key	aims	endorsed	by	three	major	zoo	associations.		Then	we	
discuss	the	values	underlying	these	aims,	including	animal	welfare	and	competing	understandings	
of	conservation.	We	consider	why	these	values	are	 important,	and	the	dilemmas	and	difficulties	
they	pose	for	decision-making	about	the	composition	of	zoo	collections.		In	concluding,	we	make	
some	tentative	suggestions	about	future	directions	for	zoo	collections.	
	
The	Aims	Expressed	by	Zoo	Associations	
In	 considering	 zoos’	 aims,	we	draw	on	mission	 statements	 and	other	 policies	 adopted	 by	 three	
major	zoo	associations:	World	Association	of	Zoos	and	Aquariums	(WAZA),	Association	of	Zoos	and	
Aquariums	 (AZA;	 primarily	 a	 US-centered	 organization),	 and	 European	 Association	 of	 Zoos	 and	
Aquaria	 (EAZA).	 	 We	 assume	 that	 in	 joining	 these	 associations,	 individual	 zoos	 endorse	 these	
statements	 and	policies	 (we	will	 not	 discuss	 zoos	 operating	 outside	 these	 associations;	 and	our	
primary	focus	is	on	zoos,	not	aquariums).	
																																								 																				
1	The	reference	of	the	printed	version	is:	
Palmer,	C;	Kasperbauer,	TJ;	Sandøe,	P:	Bears	or	butterflies?	How	should	zoos	make	value-driven	decisions	about	their	
collections?	in	The	Ark	and	Beyond,	by	Minteer,	BA,	Maienschein,	J	&	Collins,	JP	(eds.),	University	of	Chicago	Press.	
Forthcoming	2017.	
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The	 most	 prominent	 shared	 aim	 is	 to	 promote	 conservation	 to	 protect	 animal	 species,	
populations,	and	habitats.		WAZA’s	(2015a,	16)	strategy	document	(see	also	Barongi,	this	volume),	
for	 instance,	 defines	 successful	 conservation	 as	 “securing	 populations	 of	 species	 in	 natural	
habitats	 for	the	 long	term.”	 	Animals	kept	 in	zoos	should	“play	a	conservation	role	that	benefits	
wild	 counterparts”	 (WAZA	 2015a,	 17),	 in	 particular	 by	 linking	 zoo	 exhibits	 with	 fundraising	 for	
specific	in	situ	projects	involving	the	same	species	(for	instance,	through	the	“One	Plan”	approach;	
see,	 e.g.,	 Traylor-Holzer,	 Leus,	 and	 Byers,	 this	 volume).	 	 By	 2008,	 WAZA	 members	 collectively	
contributed	 over	 $350	million	 each	 year	 to	 in	 situ	 conservation	 (Gussett	 and	 Dick	 2011;	WAZA	
2015a).		Zoos	may	also	keep	animals	for	reintroduction,	or	to	serve	as	an	“assurance	population,”	
for	 reintroduction	 “when	 conditions	 are	 ripe”	 (AZA	 2014a).	 Zoos	 also	 train	 staff	 and	 wildlife	
veterinarians,	while	 conservation-relevant	 zoo	 research	may	 contribute	 to	 protecting	 species	 in	
the	 wild.	 Alongside	 direct	 contributions	 to	 field	 conservation,	 zoos	 also	 pursue	 indirect	
conservation	 work,	 in	 particular	 public	 engagement	 and	 environmental	 education	 aimed	 at	
changing	 knowledge,	 attitudes,	 and	 behavior	 with	 respect	 to	 conservation	 (WAZA	 2015a;	 AZA	
2014b).			
	
A	clearly	separate	aim	concerns	animal	welfare.		The	AZA	highlights	animal	welfare	in	its	mission	
statement:	“The	AZA	provides	 its	members	with	 the	services,	high	standards,	best	practices	and	
program	co-ordination	to	be	leaders	in	animal	welfare,	public	engagement	and	the	conservation	of	
species”	(AZA	2014b).		Caring	for	Wildlife	(WAZA	2015b)	is	a	wide-ranging	policy	statement	on	the	
significance	 of	 animal	 welfare,	 and	 WAZA	 notes	 on	 its	 website	 (n.d.)	 “The	 goal	 of	 the	 World	
Association	of	Zoos	and	Aquariums	is	to	guide,	encourage	and	support	the	zoos…	of	the	world	in	
animal	care	and	welfare,	environmental	education	and	global	conservation.”		While	EAZA	does	not	
explicitly	 mention	 animal	 welfare	 in	 its	 mission	 statement,	 its	 2009	 Code	 of	 Ethics	 requires	
members	 to	 “promote	 the	 interests…of	 animal	 welfare”;	 and	 animal	 welfare	 is	 emphasized	 in	
most	of	EAZA’s	official	guidelines	and	position	statements.			
	
It’s	 not	 clear	 exactly	 how	 promoting	 animal	 welfare	 fits	 with	 conservation,	 however.	 	 Animal	
welfare	in	EAZA,	WAZA,	and	AZA’s	statements	appears	to	require	independent	promotion,	rather	
than	being	just	a	side-constraint	on	the	pursuit	of	conservation;	this	is	certainly	how	some	leading	
interpreters	 see	 it	 (e.g.,	Maple	 and	 Perdue	 2013).	 	 However,	 zoo	 animal	welfare	 is	 not	 usually	
understood	 as	 a	 goal	 in	 the	 same	 sense	 as	 conservation.	 	 Animals	 are	 not	 kept	 in	 zoos	 just	 to	
promote	 animal	 welfare.	 For	 instance	 WAZA	 (2015a,	 59)	 describes	 conservation	 as	 zoos’	 core	
purpose,	 and	 positive	 welfare	 as	 their	 core	 activity.	 	 What	 these	 welfare	 commitments	 do	
establish,	though,	is	that	when	animals	are	kept	in	zoos,	it’s	important	that	their	welfare	is	good—
for	the	animals	themselves,	for	visitors	to	appreciate,	and	sometimes	as	an	inspiration	for	animal	
welfare	initiatives	in	other	areas	(see	Maple	and	Segura,	this	volume).	
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So	what	implications	do	these	differing	aims	have	for	the	composition	of	zoo	collections?		Direct	
conservation	 goals	 alone	 might	 suggest	 focusing	 on	 threatened	 species	 of	 ongoing	 ecological	
significance,	where	populations	may	persist	with	assistance,	and	where	there	is	some	likelihood	of	
successful	reintroduction.		While	conservation	education	may	focus	on	those	same	species,	these	
species	might	not	appeal	to	visitors,	and	so	may	not	be	ideal	for	public	engagement.		And	in	terms	
of	animal	welfare,	some	species	may	flourish	better	in	a	zoo	environment	than	others;	but	these	
species	are	not	necessarily	those	with	high	conservation	value,	or	attractiveness	to	visitors	(Dubois	
and	Fraser	2013).	 	So,	given	the	relative	 independence	of	these	aims,	zoos	may	face	conflicts	or	
trade-offs	in	terms	of	what’s	kept	in	their	collections.	
	
Some	of	these	tensions	are	acknowledged	in	the	mission	statements	or	ethical	codes	of	zoological	
associations.		WAZA	(2005,	61)	is	explicit:	“In	practice	there	could	be	a	conflict	of	interest	between	
the	 conservation	of	 a	 species	or	population	and	 the	welfare	of	 an	 individual	 animal.”	 	 But	 little	
assistance	 about	 how	 to	 tackle	 such	 conflicts	 is	 offered,	 other	 than	 to	 say	 that	 doing	 so	 may	
involve	 “weighing	 competing	 values”	 and	 that	 “these	 considerations	 are	 complex	 and	 often	
dependent	on	context.”		Similar	value	weighing	is	proposed	in	WAZA	(2015b).	The	WAZA	Code	of	
Ethics	(2005)	comments:	“Any	actions	taken	in	relation	to	an	individual	animal,	e.g.	euthanasia	or	
contraception,	 must	 be	 undertaken	 with	 this	 higher	 ideal	 of	 species	 survival	 in	 mind,	 but	 the	
welfare	of	the	individual	animal	should	not	be	compromised.”		This	gives	little	guidance	as	to	how	
zoos	might	go	about	“balancing	values,”	if	indeed	that	is	what	they	should	be	doing;	if	euthanasia	
or	contraception	are	seen	as	incompatible	with	welfare,	this	statement	may	instead	suggest	that	
weighing	species	conservation	at	the	cost	of	animal	welfare	is	not,	after	all,	permissible.		
	
Zoo	 mission	 and	 strategy	 statements	 don’t	 go	 into	 much	 detail	 about	 how	 to	 understand	 the	
values	underpinning	zoos’	aims.	 	We	therefore	now	turn	to	the	wider	 literature	 in	conservation,	
environmental,	and	animal	ethics	 to	help	 spell	out	what	might	be	meant	by	“conservation”	and	
“animal	welfare”	values.	
	
Values	Underlying	Conservation	and	Animal	Welfare	
Conservation	value	can	refer	to	conserving	a	number	of	different	things,	singly	or	in	combination:	
individuals,	 populations,	 species,	 ecosystems	 or	 more	 abstract	 qualities	 such	 as	 “wildness”	 or	
“place.”	 	 Recently	 –	 although	 this	 is	 not	 undisputed	 -	 it	 has	 been	 proposed	 that	 larger,	 more	
encompassing	 entities	 such	 as	 ecosystems	 should	 have	 conservation	 priority	 (see	 Norton,	 this	
volume).	 	Certainly,	 inasmuch	as	 zoos’	 conservation	goals	are	 tied	 to	either	original	or	potential	
future	 habitats	 of	 the	 species	 they	 support,	 a	 key	 concern	 is	 maintaining	 the	 health	 of	 (and	
potentially	 restoring	 or	 even	 creating)	 these	 ecosystems	 (WAZA	 2005,	 11).	 	 Ecosystems	 may	
provide	 both	 consumptive	 values	 (such	 as	 food	 sources)	 and	 non-consumptive	 values	 including	
places	and	 landscapes	that	people	value	for	cultural,	historical,	and	aesthetic	reasons.	 	On	some	
(admittedly	contested)	ethical	views,	it’s	also	argued	that	we	have	direct	moral	responsibilities	to	
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ecosystems,	 independent	 of	 their	 instrumental	 value	 (e.g.,	 Johnson	 1992).	 	 So,	 there	 are	many	
value-based	reasons	for	supporting	zoos’	ecosystemic	goals.	
	
Zoo	 conservation	may	 also	 be	 committed	 to	 the	 value	 of	 species	 themselves	 or	 at	 least	 to	 the	
value	of	some	 species.	 	 Species	 can	be	highly	valued	 for	 intrinsic	qualities	 such	as	 charisma	 (for	
instance,	polar	bears)	or	beauty;	or	 their	apparent	 similarity	 to	human	beings,	as	 in	 the	case	of	
gorillas	(dePinho	et	al.	2014;	Russow	1981).		Philosophers	such	as	Johnson	(1992)	and	Staples	and	
Cafaro	 (2012)	 argue	 that	we	 have	 direct	 duties	 to	 species	 as	well	 as	 ecosystems.	 These	 values	
persist	even	if	species	have	no	remaining	natural	habitat,	as	 in	the	case	of	Pere	David’s	Deer;	or	
when	reintroduction	seems	unlikely,	as	with	members	of	amphibian	species	being	kept	in	zoos	to	
avoid	extinction	from	chytid	fungus	in	the	wild	(see	Mendelson,	this	volume).		
	
Another	distinct	value	 is	 that	of	good	animal	welfare.	 	Welfare	 is	 typically	understood	 in	one	of	
three	 ways:	 in	 terms	 of	 animals’	 positive	 and	 negative	 subjective	 experiences,	 and/or	 the	
satisfaction	or	 frustration	of	 their	preferences,	 and/or	 their	 ability	 to	perform	natural	 behaviors	
(Appleby	 and	 Sandøe	 2002).	 	 In	 the	 animal	 welfare	 literature	 there’s	 significant	 disagreement	
between	 those	who	 think	 that	only	 animals’	 subjective	experiences	 are	 relevant	 to	welfare	 and	
those	 who	 maintain	 that	 being	 able	 to	 perform	 natural	 behaviors	 makes	 an	 independent	
contribution	to	welfare.	Concern	for	both	the	subjective	states	of	animals	and	animals’	ability	to	
perform	 natural	 behavior	 appears	 in	 zoo	 association	 documents,	 and	 both	 seem	 important	 to	
animal	welfare	in	zoos.	Many	animals	held	in	zoo	collections	are	sentient,	that	is,	able	to	undergo	
subjective	experiences	of	pain	and	pleasure,	and	to	be	in	other	positive,	or	aversive,	experiential	
states.	 	 WAZA	 (2005)	 commits	 zoos	 to	 avoid	 both	 causing	 and	 allowing	 suffering	 (i.e.,	 strong	
and/or	 protracted	 episodes	 of	 pain	 or	 other	 aversive	 states)	 in	 animals	 under	 their	 care,	 and	
emphasizes	the	 importance	of	allowing	zoo	animals	to	perform	natural	behaviors.	 	However,	 it’s	
not	clear	whether	performing	natural	behaviors	here	is	regarded	as	 independently	 important,	or	
important	only	in	terms	of	the	resulting	experiences	of	the	animals	concerned.		This	may	matter	
when	promoting	natural	behavior	conflicts	with	preventing	suffering	–	for	example,	when	deciding	
whether	male	animals	should	be	allowed	to	fight,	or	when	fostering	“wild	behaviors”,	potentially	
stressful	to	captive	animals,	prior	to	reintroductions	(WAZA	2015a,	60;	see	Greene,	this	volume).	
	
Other	 issues	 also	 require	 clarification.	 	 First,	 some	animals	 kept	 in	 zoo	 collections	 –	particularly	
invertebrates	–	may	not	have	a	welfare,	at	least	in	the	sense	of	having	subjective	experiences	or	
preferences.		It	still	makes	sense	to	talk	about	them	performing	“natural	behaviors”,	but	there’s	a	
question	whether	this	matters	in	animals	lacking	sentience.		
	
Second,	concern	about	zoo	animal	experience	has,	historically,	focused	more	on	avoiding	negative	
welfare	 (such	 as	 suffering)	 than	 providing	 positive	 welfare	 –	 in	 terms	 of	 feelings	 of	 pleasure,	
satisfaction,	 or	 excitement	 (Maple	 and	 Perdue,	 2013)	 or	 the	 opportunity	 to	 exercise	 natural	
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behaviors.	 	 The	 recent	emphasis	on	enriched	environments	 in	 zoos	 indicates	 increasing	concern	
for	positive	welfare,	as	does	the	new	emphasis	on	animal	“wellness”	(see	Maple	and	Segura,	this	
volume;	WAZA	2015b);	but	there’s	still	a	question	about	how	significant	positive	welfare	actually	is	
in	practice	for	zoos.	
	
Third,	while	a	focus	on	animal	welfare	centers	on	the	ongoing	quality	of	animals’	 lives,	 it	can	be	
argued	that	it	doesn’t	necessarily	have	implications	for	the	length	of	their	lives,	and	therefore	for	
painless	culling	of	healthy	but	“surplus”	animals.		This	view,	though,	is	controversial;	Kasperbauer	
and	Sandøe	(2016)	defend	the	view	that	painless	culling	may	be	a	welfare	issue.			
	
This	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	 values	 that	 underlie	 concern	 for	 conservation	 and	 animal	 welfare	
indicates	 tensions	 between	 different	 conservation	 values,	 between	 different	 ideas	 of	 animal	
welfare,	 and,	 in	 addition,	 potential	 conflicts	 between	 conservation	 values	 and	 animal	 welfare	
values.		This	may	give	rise	to	complex	and	contested	situations,	especially	when	thinking	about	a	
value-driven	species	composition	 for	 zoo	collections.	 	We’ll	now	return	 to	 this	discussion	of	 zoo	
collections	more	directly,	drawing	on	debates	about	 the	possible	 future	of	 conservation	and	on	
recent	empirical	studies	of	conservation	and	animal	welfare.	
	
	
Composition	of	collections	of	zoos	in	light	of	their	different	aims	
	
Zoo	collections	and	direct	conservation	value	
Zoos	 are	 limited	 in	 terms	 of	 space	 and	 resources;	 not	 all	 species	 of	 conservation	 value	 can	 be	
conserved.	 	 So,	 zoos	must	 operate	 tactically	 by	 using	 their	 collections	 to	 best	 serve	 their	 own	
conservation	goals.	But	these	will	vary,	depending	on	what	conservation	values	are	prioritized.	
Strategic	decisions	of	this	sort	are	being	taken	by	zoos	and	zoo	associations,	for	instance	as	part	of	
IUCN	 Population	Management	 Strategies.	 	 The	AZA’s	 Regional	 Collection	 Plan	Handbook	 (2012)	
outlines	the	criteria	Taxon	Advisory	Groups	should	use	when	making	recommendations	for	which	
species	should	be	managed	by	groups	of	zoos.		First	among	these	criteria	are	“conservation	status”	
and	“extinction	risk	in	the	wild.”		Do	zoo	collections	currently	manifest	this	priority?	
	
Leader-Williams	et	al.	(2007)	found	that	the	numbers	of	threatened	species	held	by	zoos	increased	
from	103	 in	1993	 to	230	 in	2003	 (mostly	non-mammalian	 species).	 	However,	 recent	 studies	of	
current	 zoo	 collections	 have	 questioned	 whether	 these	 increases	 are	 sufficient	 to	 meet	
conservation	goals.	Conde	et	al.	 (2013,	3),	 for	 instance,	 compared	 the	 species	held	 in	 zoos	with	
those	 listed	 on	 the	 IUCN	 Red	 List	 as	 vulnerable,	 endangered,	 or	 critically	 threatened	 (together	
called	 “threatened”)	 and	 concluded	 that	 with	 a	 few	 exceptions	 “most	 collections	 are	 not	
distinguishable	from	what	would	be	expected	if	the	species	were	selected	at	random.”		Martin	et	
al.	(2014)	compared	bird	and	mammal	species	held	in	zoos	to	the	most	closely	related	species	not	
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held	 in	 zoos,	 and	 found	 that	 (inter	 alia)	 zoo	 species	 tended	 to	 be	 less,	 rather	 than	 more,	
threatened	with	extinction.		These	and	other	studies	suggest	that	given	zoos’	own	commitments,	
there’s	room	for	a	greater	focus	on	threatened	species	in	practice.	
	
An	earlier	 study	by	Conde	et	al.	 (2011)	 raises	another	 issue	about	 the	 fit	between	conservation	
and	the	composition	of	zoo	collections:	the	classes	of	species	held	in	zoos.		While	one-fifth	to	one-
quarter	of	 IUCN	threatened	and	near-threatened	mammal	species	are	 represented	 in	zoos,	only	
6.2%	of	globally	threatened	amphibian	species	are	represented	(Dawson	et	al.	2015),	even	though	
41%	of	amphibian	species	are	listed	by	the	IUCN	as	threatened	or	extinct	in	the	wild.		Taking	only	
conservation	 value	 into	 account,	 amphibians	 –	 and	 reptiles	 –	 seem	 good	 choices	 for	 zoo	
collections	 (as	 suggested,	 for	 instance,	 by	 the	 Amphibian	 Ark	 project	 –	 see	 Mendelson,	 this	
volume).	 	 In	 addition	 to	 being	 threatened,	 many	 of	 them	 require	 little	 space,	 while	 still	
contributing	as	much	to	conservation	research	and	personnel	training	as	larger	species.		
Keulartz	(2015)	recently	argued:	
	
“the	most	effective	strategy	to	combat	the	problem	of	 limited	space	is	without	any	
doubt	 a	 shift	 away	 from	 the	 large	 charismatic	 mammals	 towards	 smaller	 species,	
particularly	 amphibians,	 invertebrates	 and	 some	 species	 of	 fish,	which	 occupy	 less	
space,	 are	 relatively	 inexpensive	 to	 keep,	 have	 a	 high	 birth	 rate	 and	 are	 easy	 to	
reintroduce.”	
	
While	these	factors	may	not	apply	to	all	species,	holding	more	small-bodied,	non-mammal	species	
may	help	zoos	to	protect	endangered	species	(without,	as	we	discuss	below,	negatively	impacting	
on	visitor	responses).			
	
The	 issue	 Keulartz	 raises	 about	 reintroduction	 is,	 however,	 complicated.	 	 Reintroductions	 from	
captive	populations	have	not,	to	date,	been	very	successful.		Zoos	have	played	a	direct	role	in	the	
recovery	 and	 reintroduction	 of	 13	 animal	 species	 (though	 this	 number	 is	 contested	 in	 both	
directions;	Balmford	et	al.	2011;	Conde	et	al.	2011a;	Conde	et	al.	2011b;	Hoffmann	et	al.	2010).		
Multiple	studies	have	found	that	reintroductions	with	captive-bred	populations	are	less	successful	
than	reintroductions	with	relocated	wild	populations.	 	For	 instance,	 Jule,	Leaver,	and	Lea	 (2008)	
surveyed	 reintroductions	 of	 46	 carnivore	 species	 and	 found	 that	 48.5%	 of	 the	 reintroduced	
populations	 sourced	 from	 the	 wild,	 and	 only	 19%	 of	 the	 populations	 sourced	 from	 captivity,	
survived	6-18	months	after	release.		
	
A	 further	 inhibiting	 factor	 for	 zoos’	 captive	 breeding	 programs	 is	 that	 many	 populations	 of	
threatened	species	 in	captivity	are	small,	and	distributed	between	zoos	 (Conde	et	al.	2013).	 	To	
ensure	sufficient	genetic	diversity	 in	breeding	programs,	zoos	therefore	need	to	exchange	either	
animals	or	gametes.		Zoos	are,	of	course,	tackling	such	difficulties,	for	instance	with	collaborations	
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supported	 by	 Regional	 Collection	 Plans,	 but	 moving	 animals	 for	 breeding	 faces	 many	 hurdles	
(WAZA	 2015a,	 54).	 	 However,	 a	more	 cost-effective	 strategy	may	 be	 for	 different	 zoos	 to	 hold	
smaller	numbers	of	species	in	their	collections,	but	to	increase	the	number	of	individual	animals	in	
each	species,	which	may	also	have	welfare	benefits	(Maple	and	Purdue	2013,	150).		
	
The	likely	impact	of	climate	change	on	ecological	systems	also	raises	concerns	about	the	possible	
success	 of	 species	 reintroductions	 and	 the	 purpose	 of	 keeping	 assurance	 populations.	 	 Those	
species	 that	 flourish	 in	 such	 changing	 systems	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	 currently	 threatened	 or	
endangered.		For	many	currently	endangered	species,	changing	climate	is	likely	to	increase	threats	
and	diminish	the	likelihood	of	successful	reintroduction	into	the	foreseeable	future	-	at	least,	into	
their	current	native	habitats	(Sandler	2013).	
	
This	doesn’t	mean	that	efforts	aimed	at	reintroductions	should	be	abandoned.		But	it	does	suggest	
that	when	species	are	being	kept	for	reintroduction,	or	as	assurance	populations,	it’s	important	to	
consider	 the	 resilience	 of	 these	 species	 to	 climate	 change,	 climate	 predictions	 for	 their	 native	
habitats,	and	the	possibility	of	potential	introductions	to	non-native	locations	in	the	future.		If	wild	
reintroduction	 is	 a	 goal,	 but	 successful	 reintroduction	 anywhere	 in	 a	 realistic,	 climate-changed	
future	 looks	 unlikely,	 this	 should	 count	 against	 the	 inclusion	 of	 a	 species	 in	 a	 zoo’s	 collection	
(though	some	species	could	be	still	be	important	for	conservation-oriented	research;	Minteer	and	
Collins	2013).		If,	on	the	other	hand,	the	purpose	is	just	considered	to	be	conservation	of	certain	
species,	even	when	their	natural	habitats	are	gone,	zoos	may	still	have	an	important	role	to	play.	
As	noted	above,	some	species	are	valued	independently	of	their	wild	habitat	on	the	basis	of	their	
beauty,	 or	 charisma	 –	which	might	 contribute	 to	what	 the	AZA	 calls	 “exhibit	 value.”	 	However,	
given	zoos’	own	conservation	goals,	exhibit	value	does	not	by	itself	seem	a	sufficiently	compelling	
reason	for	keeping	animals	in	spaces	that	could	be	occupied	by	those	of	more	direct	conservation	
value.	 	But	“exhibit	value”	may	matter	when	 it	comes	to	 indirect	 conservation,	 to	which	we	will	
now	turn.	
	
Indirect	Conservation:	Education	and	Fundraising	
Alongside	 direct	 conservation,	 zoos’	 collections	 attract	 visitors,	 generate	 resources	 for	 field	
conservation,	 and	 are	 used	 for	 conservation	 education	 (see	 Barongi,	 this	 volume).	 	Without	 an	
income	 stream	 from	 visitors,	 most	 zoos	 can’t	 carry	 out	 direct	 conservation,	 and	 of	 course,	
conservation	education	requires	visitors.		Zoo	collections	must	thus	attract	visitors.	
	
If	 species	 best	 for	 direct	 conservation	 were	 also	 best	 for	 visitor	 preference	 and	 conservation	
education,	 zoos’	 collection	decisions	would	 (in	 these	 respects)	be	 relatively	 simple.	 	And	 in	 fact,	
such	 decisions	 may	 be	 fairly	 simple,	 at	 least	 in	 terms	 of	 what	 can	 be	 gleaned	 from	 current	
research.	 	 After	 reviewing	 the	 literature,	 we	 could	 find	 little	 evidence	 of	 significant	 negative	
impacts	on	visitor	numbers	or	conservation	education	when	zoos	did	primarily	select	species	ideal	
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for	direct	conservation.		On	the	contrary,	there’s	evidence	that	people	are	particularly	interested	
in	seeing	rare	and	endangered	animals	(Whitworth,	2012).	
	
It’s	widely	believed,	however,	 that	 charismatic	mammals,	and	species	with	 large	body	sizes,	are	
needed	to	attract	visitors.		This	view	may	have	affected	the	current	composition	of	zoo	collections.		
Frynta	et	al.	 (2010,	2013)	 found	that	people’s	 ranking	of	an	animal’s	beauty,	as	well	as	 its	body	
size,	were	good	predictors	of	whether	 that	species	would	be	 found	 in	zoos	–	 implying	that	zoos	
take	these	factors	 into	account	when	forming	their	collections,	and	that	animals	of	this	kind	are	
well	represented	in	zoos.		
	
However,	 it	 has	 been	 difficult	 to	 establish	what	 visitors’	 preferences	 actually	 are	 regarding	 the	
physical	 features	 of	 zoo	 animals.	 	 Balmford	 (2000),	 for	 instance,	 failed	 to	 find	 any	 connection	
between	body	size	and	popularity	among	zoo	visitors,	looking	both	at	his	own	data	and	that	of	4	
other	 studies.	 	 More	 recently,	Whitworth	 (2012)	 found	 that	 small	 animals	 were	 actually	 more	
popular	than	large	animals	in	UK	zoos.		He	did,	however,	find	a	weak	positive	correlation	(r	=	.268)	
between	the	popularity	of	animals	held	at	a	zoo	and	the	number	of	visitors.		This	suggests	that	the	
type	of	animals	held	by	zoos	do	matter	somewhat	for	zoo	attendance,	but	that	body	size	is	not	a	
strong	factor	influencing	which	animals	people	want	to	see.		While	further	research	is	needed,	this	
at	least	in	principle	suggests	that	keeping	animals	with	smaller	body	sizes	would	not	reduce	(and	
might	increase)	the	number	of	zoo	visitors	(a	view	perhaps	reinforced	by	Ivanyi,	this	volume).	
	
On	 the	 other	 hand	 there’s	 some	evidence	 that	mammals	 are	 the	most	 popular	 animals	 kept	 in	
zoos.	Moss	and	Esson	(2010),	 for	 instance,	studied	visitors’	 interest	 in	40	zoo	species	at	Chester	
Zoo	in	the	UK,	spanning	mammals,	birds,	reptiles,	amphibians,	fish,	and	invertebrates,	measuring	
both	the	number	of	visitors	at	each	exhibit	and	the	amount	of	 time	visitors	spent	at	 the	exhibit	
(“holding	 power”).	 	 Mammals	 were	 significantly	 more	 popular	 than	 all	 other	 groups	 on	 both	
measures.		It’s	not	clear	what	implications	this	finding	might	have	(assuming	it	could	be	confirmed	
in	 other	 studies).	 	 It	 might	 mean	 that	 while	 mammals	 are	 most	 popular	 with	 visitors,	 other	
taxonomic	groups	would	be	visited	more,	 if	 fewer	mammals	were	available.	 	Or	 it	might	suggest	
that	 zoos	 should	 keep	 some	 “flagship”	 mammals	 for	 attracting	 visitors	 and	 as	 a	 gateway	 to	
conservation	 education,	 but	 that	 they	 could	 in	 addition	 increase	 collections	 of	 smaller,	 more	
threatened	 individuals	 from	 other	 taxonomic	 groups.	 	 Another	 strategy	 might	 be	 to	 increase	
conservation	 value	 among	 mammal	 holdings	 by	 seeking	 less	 popular	 but	 threatened	 mammal	
species.	 	 Smith	 et	 al.	 (2012),	 for	 instance,	 identify	 183	 candidate	 species	 that	 receive	 very	 few	
conservation	 resources,	 but	 nonetheless	 possess	 aesthetically	 appealing	 features	 (e.g.,	 large,	
forward	facing	eyes)	for	visitors.	
	
In	terms	of	conservation	education,	we	don’t	know	much	about	what’s	specifically	 learned	from	
species	composition	in	zoos.		Studies	have	tended	to	focus	on	the	way	zoos	present	information;	
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for	instance,	whether	there’s	a	human	interpreter	at	exhibits,	and	the	effects	of	signage	(Routman	
et	al.	2010)	and	on	overall	knowledge	gained,	 for	 instance	about	biodiversity	 (Moss,	 Jensen	and	
Gussett	2015).	It	may	be	that	once	people	have	entered	the	zoo,	information	presentation	is	more	
important	than	species	composition.		
	
Although	more	research	is	needed	here,	education	and	fundraising	considerations	don’t	appear	to	
winnow	out	or	expand	the	species	suggested	by	direct	conservation	values	alone.		So,	there	may	
not	be	much	tension	between	achieving	the	aims	of	direct	and	indirect	conservation	 in	terms	of	
zoo	 species	 composition.	 	However,	 animal	welfare	 concerns	 generate	more	potential	 for	 value	
conflict.	
	
Animal	welfare	
One	potential	consequence	of	pursuing	good	animal	welfare	 is	 in	narrowing	the	species	thought	
suitable	 for	 zoos,	 since	 some	 species	 can’t	 easily	 achieve	 good	welfare	 in	 captivity	 (e.g.,	 forest	
duikers	 and	 cheetahs;	 Mason,	 2010).	 	 But	 zoos	 may	 approach	 this	 problem	 in	 different	 ways,	
depending	on	how	they	prioritize	the	value	of	animal	welfare.	Four	alternatives	are:	
	
a) Absolute	conservation	value,	no	welfare	side	constraint:	When	conservation	values	and	
the	value	of	good	animal	welfare	are	 likely	 to	come	 into	conflict,	conservation	values	
should	 always	 take	 priority,	 even	 if	 this	means	 causing	 or	 allowing	 animal	 suffering,	
frustration,	or	restriction	on	natural	behavior.		
b) Conservation	value	primary,	absolute	welfare	side	constraint:	Conservation	value	is	the	
priority	 for	zoos,	but	 it	should	not	be	pursued	 in	cases	where	doing	so	would	 lead	to	
poor	animal	welfare	(so,	for	example,	species	that	do	not	thrive	in	captivity	should	not	
be	kept).	 	Depending	on	what	understanding	of	animal	welfare	 is	adopted,	 such	 side	
constraints	will	be	more	or	less	severe.	
c) Conservation	 value	 and	 animal	 welfare	 commensurable,	 with	 weighing	 of	 values:	
Values	must	be	weighed	to	bring	about	the	best	overall	consequences	in	terms	of	both	
values.	 	 So,	 zoos	 should	 not	 sacrifice	 good	 animal	 welfare	 for	 a	 small	 gain	 in	
conservation	value.	 	But	for	a	 large	gain	in	conservation	value	–	for	 instance,	saving	a	
key	species	with	a	strong	likelihood	of	successful	captive	breeding	and	reintroduction	–	
sacrificing	a	good	deal	of	animal	welfare	 is	ethically	permissible,	 if	alternatives	aren’t	
available.		
d) Animal	 welfare	 as	 absolute	 or	 primary:	 Here	 welfare	 would	 have	 priority	 over	 any	
conflicting	conservation	values.	This	is	more	likely	to	be	adopted	in	a	sanctuary	than	a	
zoo.	
	
A	 zoo	 that	 accepted	 (a)	 would	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 taking	 animal	 welfare	 as	 seriously	 as	 zoo	
association	commitments	require.		WAZA	(2015b)	seems	to	support	(c),	recommending	that	zoos		
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“Evaluate	whether	the	animal	welfare	implications	of	management	interventions	are	outweighed	
by	their	conservation	benefits.”		But	WAZA	(2005)	seems	to	propose	a	version	of	(b)	when	values	
conflict,	 since	 “the	 welfare	 of	 the	 individual	 animal	 should	 not	 be	 compromised.”	 	 However,	
depending	on	what’s	meant	by	“welfare	compromise”,	this	may	not	amount	to	a	very	strong	side-
constraint.		The	species	selection	criteria	outlined	in	the	AZA	Regional	Collection	Plan	Handbook,	
for	instance,	while	emphasizing	conservation,	only	says	of	welfare	that	member	institutions	need	
to	 consider	whether	 they	 have	 sufficient	 expertise	 “to	meet	 the	 species’	 basic	 biological	 needs	
(i.e.,	 nutritional,	 medical,	 social,	 etc.)	 as	 related	 to	 maintaining	 and	 propagating	 them	 in	 AZA	
member	 institutions.”	 	 This	 doesn’t,	 for	 instance,	 mention	 positive	 welfare,	 although	 this	 does	
appear	in	other	more	recent	documents	(e.g.,	WAZA	2015b).			
	
On	approaches	(b)	and	(c),	zoos	should	consider	whether	they	have	sufficient	capacity	to	provide	
good	welfare	 for	 animals	 before	 acquiring	 them	 (see	 IUCN	2014).	 	 Research	 suggests	 that	 even	
among	 closely	 related	 species,	 some	do	much	better	 than	others	 in	 zoos.	 	 For	 instance,	 among	
raptors,	kestrels	seem	to	do	better	than	sparrowhawks,	especially	in	terms	of	mortality	rates;	and	
among	psittacines,	macaws	do	much	 less	well	 in	terms	of	 feather-plucking	and	breeding	success	
than	lorikeets	(Mason	et	al.	2010).		Given	zoos’	welfare	commitments,	and	the	fact	that	zoos	must	
make	 choices	 between	 species,	 these	 kinds	 of	 difference	 (taking	 into	 account	 any	 known	
environmental	changes	that	could	help	improve	welfare)	should	impact	collection	decisions.	
	
However,	welfare	as	a	selection	criterion	might	still	 lead	to	conflict	with	conservation	values.	 	A	
number	of	studies	have	suggested	that	endangered	species	are	more	likely	to	have	poor	welfare,	
as	 it	 may	 be	 harder	 to	 meet	 their	 needs.	 	 Martin	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 for	 instance,	 note	 that	 more	
threatened	 species	 existing	 only	 in	 the	wild	were	 larger,	 and	 occupied	more	 land,	 than	 closely	
related	 species	 found	 in	 zoos;	 and	 that	 these	 features	 might	 make	 them	 harder	 to	 keep	 in	
captivity.		Mason	et	al.	(2015)	hypothesized	that	anthropogenic	changes	to	the	wild—in	terms	of	
changing	habitats,	restrictions	on	ranging	and	dispersal,	shifts	in	climate,	new	infectious	diseases,	
pollutants,	and	changing	social	structures—pose	similar	challenges	to	animals	as	being	taken	into	
captivity.		It’s	possible,	then,	that	some	species	struggling	from	anthropogenic	influences	on	their	
wild	 habitat	 may	 also	 struggle	 living	 in	 an	 anthropogenic	 captive	 environment,	 and	 for	 similar	
reasons.		This	conclusion	may	at	least	suggest	caution	about	keeping	some	species	endangered	for	
anthropogenic	 reasons	 in	 zoos.	 	 Furthermore,	 since	 the	world	 outside	 the	 zoo	 is	 likely	 to	 come	
under	 increasing	 anthropogenic	 influence,	 reintroductions	 from	 these	 species	 in	 the	 future	 are	
likely	to	be	challenging.		
	
To	provide	 improved	welfare,	and	meet	conservation	goals,	 some	 recent	 research	 suggests	 that	
zoos	could	expand	the	inclusion	of	indigenous	and	native	animals	in	their	collections	(Maple	and	
Perdue	2013).	 	The	Phoenix	Zoo,	for	example,	has	been	breeding	and	reintroducing	 into	Arizona	
species	native	to	the	Southwest,	including	Chiricahua	leopard	frogs	and	desert	pupfish	(see	Allard	
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and	Wells,	this	volume).		Such	programs	of	breeding	locally	threatened	fish,	amphibians,	reptiles,	
and	 invertebrates	 seem	 ideal	 for	 zoo	 collections:	 they	 focus	 on	 threatened	 species	 needing	
conservation;	they	are	part	of	current	and	successful	reintroduction	programs;	these	species	may	
take	up	less	space	than	large	mammals;	and	they	may	raise	fewer	welfare	problems	because	they	
are	 already	 in	 an	 appropriate	 climate	 and	need	 to	 travel	 less	 far	 to	 be	 reintroduced.	 	 Research	
suggests	 that	 visitors	 do	 want	 to	 see	 local	 animals.	 A	 recent	 study	 by	 Roe	 et	 al.	 (2014),	 for	
instance,	 found	that	70%	of	visitors	rated	seeing	endemic	or	 local	species	as	a	high	or	very	high	
priority,	as	opposed	to	fewer	than	half	of	zoo	officials.	 	One	might	hypothesize	(as	Roe	et	al.	do)	
that	exhibits	of	regional	wildlife	could	help	both	in	developing	understanding	of	local	species	and	
suggesting	how	visitors	might	protect	local	environments.	
	
	
Conclusions	
This	paper	has	explored	how	zoos	 committed	 to	 the	 values	of	 conservation	and	animal	welfare	
might	strategically	develop	the	composition	of	their	collections.		We	suggested	that:	
	
• Zoos	could	hold	a	higher	proportion	of	 IUCN	listed	threatened	species	to	better	meet	
their	commitment	to	conservation,	although	these	species	may	pose	particular	welfare	
challenges	in	captivity.	
• Zoos	should	consider	expanding	their	collections	to	include	less	space	intensive	species,	
particularly	amphibians,	reptiles,	invertebrates	and	some	fish.		These	species	may	also	
raise	fewer	welfare	concerns.	
• Evidence	 suggests	 that	 holding	 more	 small	 and	 non-mammalian	 species	 would	 not	
discourage	visitors,	but	there	is	also	evidence	that	holding	some	charismatic	mammals	
would	attract	visitors	and	promote	zoos’	conservation	mission.		
• Reintroductions	 from	 zoos	 have	 so	 far	 had	 limited	 success	 and	 climate	 change	 will	
make	 reintroductions	 even	 more	 difficult.	 	 This	 may	 weigh	 against	 assurance	
populations	 and	 suggest	 that	 species	 should	 be	 kept	 for	 reintroductions	 only	 where	
plausible	in	a	climate-changed	world.	
• Where	 species	 cannot	have	good	welfare	 in	 zoos,	 this	 should	normally	 count	 against	
their	inclusion	in	zoo	collections.		Animal	welfare	concerns	should	include	both	positive	
and	 negative	 welfare,	 but	 there	 is	 debate	 about	 the	 relative	 significance	 of	 positive	
welfare	and	whether	to	include	opportunities	for	natural	behavior	as	a	consideration	in	
its	own	right.	
• Zoos	 should	 consider	 expanding	 their	 native	 and	 endemic	 collections	 –	 the	 Arizona-
Sonora	 Desert	 Museum	 in	 Tucson	 (see	 Ivanyi	 and	 Colodner,	 this	 volume)	 is	 a	 good	
example	of	this.	
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So,	to	answer	the	question	in	our	title:	given	their	own	value	commitments,	zoos	may	do	best	to	
expand	 their	 collections	 of	 less	 space-intensive,	 local,	 threatened,	 invertebrate	 populations,	
especially	 in	 cases	 where	 animals	 lack	 subjective	 welfare	 (such	 as	 butterflies)	 or	 their	 welfare	
needs	are	relatively	easy	to	fulfill.	 	But	they	could	hold,	 in	addition,	a	 few	charismatic	“flagship”	
mammals,	if	they	can	thrive	and	have	good	positive	welfare	in	captivity.	
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